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 This article describes the management of an imaginary oil-scarcity crisis by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The affair arose in response to “peak 
oil” claims by scientists of the U.S. Department of the Interior between 1908 and 
1920. With increasing vehemence over those years, these scientists forecast—
mistakenly—that a decline of domestic oil production was imminent, with total 
exhaustion to follow by the 1930s. Progressivism was the political ideology from 
which Interior’s peak-oil science sprang, and Progressivism likewise guided 
Daniels’s effort to protect the Navy from the ostensible peak-oil crisis.
Early-twentieth-century Progressivism was a movement for social and eco-
nomic reform. Progressives of that era were alarmed over industrialization and 
urbanization and resented the power wielded by new, giant business organiza-
tions such as oil, automobile, and steel corporations. Progressives sought to re-
duce the great concentration of wealth that such new kinds of businesses had put 
into the hands of a few. They also resented the unfamiliar new workers in their 
midst: black laborers from the South and immigrants from Ireland and eastern 
and southern Europe.
Today, Progressivism is mainly an urban, racially diverse movement, but in 
Daniels’s time it also was a rural one. Many Pro-
gressives were deeply racist; for southern Progres-
sives especially, white racial supremacy was both 
a belief and a political objective. Josephus Daniels 
was one such Progressive. He grew up in a rural 
North Carolina still smarting from Confeder-
ate defeat in the Civil War. Daniels was deeply 
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affronted by the indignity (to him) of life in a society in which blacks could vote 
and hold high office. All his life, Daniels nurtured hostility against blacks and 
their ostensible sponsors—northern Republicans. He became a newspaperman, 
and his business acumen was such that by the age of twenty-one he owned three 
newspapers. Later, as owner and publisher of the Raleigh News & Observer, he 
led North Carolina’s white-power movement. Daniels’s role in the triumphs of 
southern Progressivism brought national attention.1 
Both political parties espoused Progressive ideals in the early twentieth 
century. Theodore Roosevelt was a Republican, yet his administration began the 
antitrust lawsuit that would lead to the breakup of Standard Oil of New Jersey 
in 1911. Roosevelt also set in motion an effort to use science as an instrument 
of politics. The idea of advancing civilization through scientific knowledge was 
an important tenet of Progressivism. Roosevelt believed that the conservation 
movement he did so much to advance should be guided by science. It was not 
simply that forests, wetlands, and wildlife were disappearing in an industrializing 
landscape; Americans, Roosevelt argued, would need these resources as 
the United States fought against other states for survival. In other words, to 
Progressives like Roosevelt, conservation was a national-security project.2 
In 1908, Roosevelt proclaimed that domestic coal, oil, and iron ore were 
near exhaustion. The venue was a “Conference of Governors,” which Roosevelt 
convened at the White House. The prestigious audience he gathered to his 
conference was a measure of the importance Roosevelt attached to conservation. 
In attendance were most of the nation’s governors, most members of Congress 
and the Supreme Court, and top business and labor leaders. Such a powerful 
conclave of Americans never had met before and never has again.
Impending exhaustion of fossil fuels and iron ore, the president warned, was 
“the weightiest problem now before the nation,” because “these resources are the 
final basis of national power and perpetuity.” It was “ominously evident that these 
resources are in the course of rapid exhaustion.”3 Although Roosevelt cited no 
evidence for his extraordinary claims, they drew legitimacy from the environmental 
destruction that Americans could see all around them. If fish were dying and forests 
disappearing, it made sense that minerals could be disappearing too.
Roosevelt initiated a scientific megaproject to confirm his peak-mineral theories 
and advance other scientific efforts that he deemed critical to American survival. 
Interior’s first peak-oil forecast appeared in the scientific publication resulting from 
this project, a gigantic three-volume tome that covered diverse societal problems 
and their ostensible solutions. Along with prescient public-health and biological-
conservation recommendations, the report called for ghastly eugenic measures 
such as forced sterilization and state intervention in citizens’ choice of marriage 
partners.4 With respect to the oil problem, United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
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geologist David Day asserted that since new oil fields were unlikely to be found, 
U.S. production probably would cease by the mid-1930s.5 
However, several USGS geologists cautioned that British scientists had been 
predicting exhaustion of Britain’s coal production—mistakenly—since 1866, 
and saw no reason to expect exhaustion of American coal or iron ore. They also 
pointed out how easy it was to overlook how new technology steadily uncovered 
previously unimaginable volumes of mineral resources.6 The rest of government 
ignored these insights.
Although Woodrow Wilson did not share Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for forests 
and wildlife, he was no less committed to the use of science as a tool of govern-
ment. As a young Bryn Mawr College professor in 1887, he wrote a paper ad-
vocating that a “science of administration” could reform American governance. 
Scientists, Wilson argued, should govern almost all aspects of society, free from 
the messy business of democratic compromise, and applying best practices wher-
ever found. “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow 
his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to 
commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing 
a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of 
my republican spots.”7 This was a formulation that depended on perfect behavior 
by administrative scientists; Wilson trusted that they never would abuse the great 
power he proposed they should have by putting personal or bureaucratic interests 
ahead of verifiable truths.
Elected president as a Democrat in 1912, Wilson granted this kind of great 
power to scientists to manage the imaginary problem of peak oil. He also granted 
great power to his executive departments to persecute labor unionists, anarchists, 
and, in the end, anyone who questioned government policy. He oversaw passage 
of coercive laws—the Sedition Act, the Espionage Act—that criminalized criti-
cism of the war effort. Sanctioned by the Department of Justice, a vigilante force 
known as the American Protective League harassed labor unionists, pacifists, 
and immigrants.8 
Ostensibly, science provided the rationale for a foreign adventure promoted 
by Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who contrived the first 
iteration of “oil-scarcity ideology”—the ostensible imperative to do something 
aggressive to avert a peak-oil crisis. When Mexico experienced an extended 
period of banditry and revolutionary violence in its oil fields, Bryan wrote to 
President Wilson on 9 April 1914 to argue that the instability threatened oil 
exports to the United States. Interior’s peak-oil forecast bore directly on this 
problem. As Bryan explained to Wilson, peak oil made Mexican oil strategic: 
“These fields are furthermore regarded as the inevitable source from which, in 
the near future, the supply of oil for the United States Navy will largely be drawn.” 
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Bryan recommended that Wilson intervene to control the oil-producing region 
around Veracruz.9 
Wilson obliged, sending a USN flotilla to that city. On 21 April 1914, Ameri-
can naval infantrymen and Marines went ashore and subdued the port; they 
suffered few casualties, but over a hundred Mexican soldiers, naval cadets, and 
civilians died defending the city. Wilson had secondary motivations in invading, 
one of which was to restore the recognized Mexican president, José Venustiano 
Carranza, to office. However, occupation restored neither order to the region nor 
Carranza to office; rather, the presence of foreign troops on Mexican soil gave 
the warring factions the only thing they ever could agree on: that the American 
invaders should leave. Opposition to occupation even came from the Carrancista 
faction that Wilson sought to help.10 After seven months, nineteen U.S. combat 
deaths, and at least two hundred Mexican combat deaths, American forces with-
drew.11 Thus peak oil, as imagined by Theodore Roosevelt and constructed by 
Interior, became the proximal rationale for America’s first adventure to secure 
foreign oil. The subject of this article, however, is a more unusual instance of U.S. 
aggression rationalized by oil-scarcity ideology: aggression directed not against 
foreign oil-producing countries but against domestic oil firms, in a campaign 
directed by Josephus Daniels.
There has been relatively little scholarship on Daniels. When scholars do 
mention him, he sometimes is lauded as a Progressive hero for his battle to re-
patriate mineral patents adjoining Naval Oil Reserve lands.12 A relatively recent 
biography gives a more balanced account of his life and times.13 This article offers 
a novel assessment of Daniels via a study of how he procured fuel for the oil-
powered Navy he helped bring into being.
Daniels’s time in office can be understood as a response to two ideals: Progres-
sivism; and peak oil, the great oil-related fear of the Wilson years. Expectation of 
peak oil moved Daniels to do all he could to avoid drawing down the Naval Oil 
Reserve, which, according to his plan, was to sustain the Navy after the rest of the 
world’s oil fields ran dry. To preserve the Naval Oil Reserve, Daniels ultimately 
resorted to seizing oil, always at a below-market price and sometimes without 
compensation at all. As will be shown, the secretary’s campaign to save the Navy 
from both peak oil and the ostensible predations of “big oil” would end in a law-
less fiasco; during his last months in office, Daniels oversaw fuel-oil seizures from 
California refinery wharves, led by armed Marines.
Daniels saw the Navy not only as an instrument of war but also as a venue for 
moral improvement. He decried the depravity of the rich and famous of Newport, 
Rhode Island, whose bad example threatened the moral well-being of sailors 
stationed there.14 Moral purpose also propelled Daniels’s oil policy. Daniels had 
a straightforward attitude toward all Navy procurement terms—that they were 
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unfair until proved otherwise—a view that reflected Democratic Party suspicions 
of war profiteering undimmed since the Civil War.15 Daniels went to extraordi-
nary lengths to contest perceived corporate exploitation of the government—a 
posture that would have a negative impact on the wartime oil supply.
Daniels generated controversy throughout his tenure as secretary. One 
manifestation was hearings in 1919 by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, in 
which leading naval officers such as then–Vice Admiral William S. Sims aired 
their grievances against Daniels’s unorthodox practices. A book by Lieutenant 
Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USN, a Sims aide and a historian, that summarizes the 
hearings declares that Daniels “was concerned solely with purely peace activities; 
with economy in expenditure, with semi-socialistic enterprises such as the 
establishment of industrial plants to manufacture armour, guns, clothing, etc.; 
with measures advertised as inspired by a desire to improve the lot of the enlisted 
men.”16 This behavior, Kittredge asserted, left the Navy unprepared for World 
War I.
Although this article also reaches negative conclusions about Daniels, some 
of his legacy is emphatically positive. He committed the Navy to oil propulsion 
sometime around 1913, catapulting the United States into the front rank of naval 
powers. Then, in 1920, he sent some of the new oil-powered warships to home 
ports on the Pacific coast. This made the Navy a truly two-ocean force for the 
first time since the advent of coal propulsion; previously, coal-burning warships 
would have remained confined during wartime to a relatively narrow sailing 
radius near the Pacific coast. The establishment of an oil-powered Pacific Fleet 
was a brilliant policy, yet Daniels’s radicalism turned this triumph into a debacle 
of internal piracy.
PEAK OIL AND NAVAL PLANNING
Although oil was a superior fuel that would not require a network of far-flung 
coaling stations—which Britain had and America did not—the new oil-powered 
Navy still had a fueling problem, at least according to certain geologists of the De-
partment of the Interior. U.S. oil production, they claimed, would be exhausted 
completely by about 1935, leaving the Navy to rely on imported oil to operate.17 
Because the United States produced the vast majority of world oil at the time 
(69 percent in 1918, for example), the prospect of descending from this position 
to a future of import reliance was a fearful one, especially in an era that prized 
autarchy.18 
Daniels’s activism over petroleum-product prices began after his decision 
to commit the Navy to oil propulsion in 1913.19 Before committing the Navy 
to oil, Daniels consulted Interior about whether the oil supply from the federal 
lands that were planned as an oil reserve would be sufficient for the needs of the 
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oil-powered fleet in the future. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane assured 
Daniels that the Naval Oil Reserve then anticipated contained more than enough 
oil for all warships planned or under construction during their projected twenty-
year life span. Lane cautioned, however, that the price would rise as oil ran out 
in the 1930s.20 As Secretary Bryan had with respect to Mexico, Daniels took 
Interior’s oil findings seriously. The prospect of peak oil would shape Daniels’s 
decisions about the naval oil supply for his entire tenure in the administration.
Daniels’s plan was to lock away the Naval Oil Reserve against the time when 
all other American fields were exhausted. A dwindling supply must mean higher 
oil prices, as Secretary Lane had warned, and higher prices already were worry-
ing the Navy’s General Board. The board’s president was Admiral George Dewey, 
whose close brush with the bottom of his coal locker in the 1898 Battle of Manila 
Bay would seem a strong qualification for analyzing the Navy’s fuel supply. Un-
fortunately, in 1911 Dewey accepted Interior’s peak-oil dogma without question, 
as did some other flag officers. The chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
for example, anticipated “[t]he probability of an eventual demand for petroleum 
greatly exceeding the supply,” recapitulating Interior’s position on peak oil.21 This 
perspective led the board to the worrying conclusion that if price increases con-
tinued “oil producers might not care to bid for naval contracts, or if they did their 
prices would be practically prohibitive.” The board’s report, entitled “A Supply of 
Oil at a Reasonable Price,” asserted that only via establishment of the Naval Oil 
Reserve and refining operation could the Navy be protected from profiteers.22 
Daniels enthusiastically adopted these recommendations, which, in addition 
to addressing peak oil, embodied suspicions regarding capitalism that were 
endemic to the era. Adding a tone of urgency to his advocacy for an oil operation 
of the Navy’s own, he declared, “[T]o-day [in 1913] the United States Navy is 
paying over twice as much as it did for its oil in 1911. The only relief possible from 
what will be a staggering item in the expense account of the Navy in the future is 
the control of oil wells, and the refining of its own oil by the Navy department.” 
Until the Navy had its own oil company, Daniels pleaded, government could not 
“escape the charge of willful waste of public money if it continues to purchase oil 
at prices which may fatten the pockets of a few oil companies.”23 
Of course, a rising price was also what would be expected under peak oil, as 
Secretary Lane had explained. This presented a paradox that Progressives such as 
Daniels never tried to reconcile; that is, as oil became scarcer during the peak-oil 
crisis that supposedly was already in progress, the price must increase, yet Pro-
gressives also were certain that any price increase must be the result of profiteer-
ing by greedy, monopolistic oil firms.
Uncomfortably for Daniels, a price collapse in 1915 forced him to redefine 
why, with oil now abundant, peak oil was still a threat and his campaign for Navy 
oil operations was still necessary. Daniels declared that the market was cyclical, 
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then followed this unremarkable observation with a colossal non sequitur. “With 
the present methods of producing and marketing oil, there will be periods of 
overproduction, low price, and extended use of oil, and periods of shortage of 
oil production, high price, and limited use of oil, so that as a final result the oil 
resources of the country will be rapidly depleted.”24 Daniels offered no evidence 
for this remarkable idea—that market cyclicality induced resource exhaustion.
Daniels’s proposal to Congress for a Naval Oil Reserve was equally astonish-
ing. “[The reserve] would not be drawn upon when oil could be purchased on 
the open market at a fair price, but when the decreased production and increased 
price had shut off all other sources of oil for the Navy, then the reserves could 
be drawn upon and the United States Navy would have a supply of fuel for many 
years, whereas the navies of other nations that had not made a similar provision 
for a fuel oil supply would be forced to depend on coal as a fuel.”25 Implicit in 
this scenario was that peak oil would strike all over the world at the same mo-
ment, leaving the U.S. Navy with the last oil on earth, in the form of the Naval 
Oil Reserve. In scientific debates it sometimes is said that extraordinary claims 
require extraordinary evidence; Daniels offered none. Not even the peak-oil 
scientist-advocates at Interior had gone so far as to assert that peak oil would oc-
cur simultaneously throughout the world.
When the price began to rise again in 1916, Progressives were quick to call 
for intervention to rein in Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ, often referred to as 
“Jersey”), the world’s largest oil firm, which they assumed must be responsible. 
Prohibition Party congressman Charles Randall offered a resolution to nationalize 
the oil industry.26 Yet ultimately, Daniels found himself defending the idea of 
naval oil operations from opposition from within his own party. In March 1916, 
California senator James Phelan offered a bill to legalize patents within Naval Oil 
Reserve No. 2. Patents were legal rights to minerals on federal lands that were 
given to private claimants in the late nineteenth century or were granted to later 
claimants who promised to prospect for minerals. Phelan’s goal in attempting to 
legalize the patents was to stimulate California oil-production growth, which had 
declined during a legal campaign by Daniels to repatriate the patents, because oil 
developers were enjoined from working patent claims. Daniels bitterly opposed 
Phelan’s bill, claiming it would strip the Navy of the fuel it must have in the future, 
thus forcing a return to coal.27 Since the Navy’s other two reserves ostensibly held 
just five years of wartime supply, Daniels argued, the viability of the fleet was at 
stake if patents to Reserve No. 2 could not be obtained. Phelan dismissed Daniels’s 
characterization of coming scarcity as absurd.28 And history proved him right; 
when Reserve No. 2 was sold eight decades later, in 1998, it already had produced 
four times the amount Daniels believed it held, yet still brought $3.7 billion.29 
Navy oil production was but one of Daniels’s ambitious plans to defeat profi-
teering. He also sought government ownership of telephone, telegraph, radio, 
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coal, steel, and merchant-shipping industries.30 After Germany’s resumption of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, however, Daniels’s nationaliza-
tion campaign took a back seat to war planning. As the country’s mood shifted 
from isolationism to war, Congress passed and Wilson signed a declaration of war 
against Germany in April 1917.
DANIELS AT WAR
Daniels’s proclivity for dramatic economic action intensified once the United 
States entered World War I. The Navy suddenly stopped paying for fuel oil, or 
at least stopped paying market price.31 It is unclear whether Navy nonpayment 
began as a dispute over price or as an effort to overawe the large oil firms that 
Daniels saw as a threat to society.
It also is possible that Daniels anticipated passage of the Food and Fuel Con-
trol Act, known as the Lever Act, which would occur in the summer of 1917. This 
wartime law would give the president authority to requisition food or fuel for 
military use at a “fair” price. Daniels may have felt that he already knew the price 
of oil was unfair and, with President Wilson’s recent reelection as a mandate, be-
lieved he could withhold payment while waiting for Lever to pass. As prices for 
commodities rose through the early summer of 1917 owing to war demand and 
war inflation, Daniels alerted Wilson that he had asked the arch-Progressive Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) to determine a “reasonable price” for oil.32 Wilson 
apparently endorsed Daniels’s combative approach, as two days later the secretary 
“threw down the gauge of battle to the producers of commodities needed by the 
navy in the prosecution of the war.” The Navy, Daniels announced, would col-
laborate with the FTC to determine the cost of coal, copper, cement, iron ore, 
and oil. “I am going to know what these things cost and give the producers liberal 
profits, but beyond that I am not going to pay.”33 
The Lever Act passed in August 1917. It warned vendors not to “exact exces-
sive prices” and explicitly forbade “excessive profits,” but it did not define fair or 
excessive. The act allowed government commandeering (as did wartime laws in 
many countries), but it stipulated that in disputes over price government agen-
cies must pay what they believed fair, leaving the ultimate price to be adjudicated 
later.34 Although Lever was meant to give the government leverage to procure war 
goods, it did not allow agencies to pay nothing for goods—which, as we will see, 
is what Daniels had the Navy do, in many cases.
The records of the Petroleum War Service Committee (PWSC), a voluntary 
body composed of industry executives whom the government had organized 
to support war logistics, chronicle an oil industry in submission to government 
coercion. In public, the oil industry kept silent on nonpayments for three years, 
perhaps for fear that complaints would revive calls for nationalization. From PWSC 
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meeting minutes, we know that oil-industry executives mentioned the nonpayment 
problem only twice before late October 1918—almost the end of the war.
However, even before the problem appeared in official PWSC records a federal 
official named Mark L. Requa had begun to address it. Requa was director of 
the oil section of a wartime agency called the U.S. Fuel Administration. Requa 
engaged an engineering firm, Sanderson & Porter, to report on “the costs of 
and prices for petroleum refinery products in the United States and relating 
especially to the fair prices for fuel oil taken by the United States Navy for the 
1917–1918 federal fiscal year.”35 This may be the earliest official record that a 
petroleum price dispute existed and that seizures were involved. How Requa 
became aware of the Navy’s nonpayment habits is unclear, but he was in almost 
daily communication with PWSC leaders, who may have communicated the 
nonpayment problems informally. Whatever the case, Requa clearly grasped that 
under Daniels’s leadership Navy commercial behavior might precipitate political 
or market crises. An independent price analysis, Requa may have thought, might 
resolve the problem quietly.
Daniels’s nonpayment policy put the Navy on the wrong side of the law. Yet in 
the days just before passage of the Lever Act, the secretary had gone even further. 
In New York Harbor, Navy vessels seized two cargoes of fuel oil destined for the 
Public Service Gas Company of New Jersey.36 The Navy’s grounds, as reported 
to a USGS geologist with the U.S. Shipping Mission, were that “they could not 
get what they wanted in New York.”37 This probably was a reference to SONJ’s 
refineries on the New Jersey side of New York Harbor.
The Navy’s seizure of oil from a public utility was brazen, to say the least, and 
attracted the attention of Attorney General (AG) Thomas Gregory. The AG was 
alarmed enough to urge a public-relations campaign to convince Americans to 
see the petroleum industry more positively. As things stood, he worried, the 
public tended to regard oilmen as “slackers,” usually a pejorative for anarchists 
and radical trade unionists viewed as lawless enemies of the state.38 Gregory 
well understood how powerful such discourse could be; a decade before, he 
himself had used it skillfully in a legal assault against a Jersey subsidiary in Texas. 
Gregory’s client at the time was the State of Texas, which successfully sought to 
exclude an SONJ subsidiary from operating there.39 
Now that he was attorney general of the United States, Gregory seemed to 
fear that private citizens might follow the Navy’s example, raiding property and 
making business more difficult for companies of all kinds. As AG, Gregory was 
the titular head of the American Protective League, whose 50,000–350,000 vol-
unteers already were breaching the civil rights of Americans and immigrants; it 
might take very little for them to move on to trashing oil companies. Although 
he had been Jersey’s archenemy in Texas, Gregory now grasped that the taint of 
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corruption, once focused only on Standard Oil, had come to apply to any firm 
and any person in the oil business. As two energy historians put it, “the onus so 
successfully attached to Standard Oil gradually extended to cover all large oil 
companies and, ultimately, the entire oil industry.”40 The Navy’s action against the 
New Jersey utility cargo signaled that industry had become too easy a target, and 
Gregory feared where it all might lead. In a final indignity related to this seizure, 
the PWSC was asked to clean up Daniels’s mess by finding replacement cargoes 
for the power company.41 
The PWSC refrained from official discussion of Navy nonpayment for fuel oil 
until late June 1918, when its members finally agreed that “[a]s to the Navy fuel 
price question, someone should see Mr. Requa and go over the whole situation 
with him.”42 The PWSC seems to have been unaware that Requa already had 
engaged Sanderson & Porter to investigate a fair price. The consultant duly 
reported in late August 1918 that the oil firms were asking for generally fair 
market prices.43 
But on 7 October 1918, Daniels rejected the consultant’s report in a letter 
to Requa’s boss, U.S. Fuel Administrator Harry A. Garfield, because, among 
other things, it did not account for large profits on crude oil by “big low-cost 
refiners and the general increase in refining profits over pre-war periods.”44 
Daniels’s rejection of the consultant’s report finally moved the PWSC to a “very 
considerable discussion on the subject of unpaid bills for the United States Navy.” 
Some bills, wrote SONJ chairman A. C. Bedford, “extend back to the time when 
the United States entered the War.”45 This was the first complaint from the PWSC 
during seventeen months of nonpayment, and it was made in private.
The Sanderson & Porter report on Navy fuel-oil prices mainly supported 
industry positions. Among its many criticisms of the Navy’s approach, the most 
important concerned the pricing scheme the FTC had devised. Sanderson & 
Porter found flaws in FTC cost-accounting systems that tried to weight profits 
across all products or across all refineries. Using such methods to determine a fair 
price, so as to limit the profits of the most profitable firms, would have regressive 
effects, the consultant maintained. Less profitable refineries, already struggling to 
make unprofitable aviation gasoline, might be forced out of business if they had 
to accept a lower price devised from a weighted average skewed by larger profits 
of larger, more-efficient firms.46 
Daniels’s rejection of the Sanderson & Porter report came despite this warning 
from the consultant, apparently because the report did not sufficiently punish 
the most profitable firms for exceeding a “fair” price. Daniels’s real objection, 
as he made clear to Fuel Administrator Garfield, was that no remedy besides 
government control would do; “the only satisfactory solution can be found in 
complete, uniform government control over both production and distribution 
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of the commodity affected.”47 Daniels failed to recognize that his obsession with 
“fair price” was becoming a readiness issue. The U.S. oil industry was straining 
to keep up with war demand from Europe, rampant inflation, and a burgeoning 
market for oil at home. The loss of any smaller, less profitable refiners would have 
a debilitating effect on the entire Allied military, whose main oil supplier was the 
United States.
Daniels meanwhile continued to refuse to pay refiners, even after passage of 
the Lever Act obliged the Navy to pay at least the price it believed fair. Sander-
son & Porter related that prior to July 1917 the Texas Company and Gulf Refin-
ing Corporation had been supplying most oil to the Navy on the Gulf Coast. 
Around this time it became apparent that these companies could not meet 
“their quotas for the fuel oil needs of the Navy and Allies owing to the heavy 
demands on the oil supplies and to the lack of ships for transportation.” The 
Navy then asked other companies to bid, yet rejected all offers received because 
it deemed the proposed prices too high.48 On this basis—because firms did not 
want the Navy’s business at the low price Daniels was willing to pay—seizures 
continued as war raged.
The consultant also disclosed that from 1 July 1917 to 12 July 1918 the Navy 
had seized five million barrels of oil, which probably was about 1.5 percent of 
U.S. production during federal fiscal year 1918 (FY18).49 However, the burden 
of Navy seizures was borne by just eighteen companies, which meant that their 
losses were considerably greater than 1.5 percent. For obvious reasons, the Navy 
targeted only large firms with refining, storage, and loading operations at tide-
water. Conveniently for Josephus Daniels, the big firms at tidewater also were 
the ones he believed most in need of punishment for the capitalist misdeed of 
seeking market prices for their products. The brunt of the seizures thus was 
borne by SONJ and its affiliates, followed by the Texas Company, Gulf Refining 
Corporation, and Atlantic Refining Company. Seizures from the Texas Company 
are of interest in that this firm had very close ties to Texas Democrats in the cabi-
net—most notably AG Gregory and Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, as 
well as Wilson’s close adviser “Colonel” Edward M. House.50 Daniels was a zealot, 
however; full payment was withheld from all the large oil firms, no matter their 
political connections.
The market value of the nonpayments was substantial. SONJ, for example, 
lost 1.54 million barrels to seizures in federal FY18, which was 5 percent of its 
refinery runs over the period.51 The impact to gross earnings probably exceeded 
10 percent.52 Of interest is that two large second-tier firms with tidewater opera-
tions escaped seizures; these were Sinclair Oil and Mexican Petroleum, whose 
principals, Harry F. Sinclair and Edward L. Doheny, respectively, later were im-
plicated, though not convicted, in the Teapot Dome scandal. After Mark Requa 
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left government, he became a Sinclair executive. These circumstances suggest, 
but do not show, collusion, as does Doheny’s strong support for Senator Phelan 
in California politics. Future historians may learn more.
THE PETROLEUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE GETS RESTLESS
During a PWSC meeting in late October 1918, the committee asked the federal 
fuel administrator, Mark Requa, to express his views on a fair price, now that 
Daniels had rejected the estimate from Sanderson & Porter. Uncharacteristically, 
Requa recommended confrontation, and determined to take the matter to the 
highest level he could. He suggested that a report be made to Bernard Baruch’s 
Price Fixing Committee, which would argue for the companies’ compensation 
claims. The Price Fixing Committee and its predecessor, the War Industries 
Board, “were perhaps the most important” among government price-regulating 
agencies during World War I.53 
As the possibility of victory in the war came more firmly into sight, industry’s 
willingness to keep quiet about the seizures waned. PWSC members eagerly com-
mitted themselves to collecting detailed reports from aggrieved firms and giving 
them “to Mr. Requa for whatever action he might deem wise to take.”54 A month 
later, the PWSC adopted a formal, yet still private resolution supporting Requa’s 
effort to resolve the companies’ claims, and another resolution calling for the 
FTC to desist investigating oil prices.55 
By the time the Treaty of Versailles was agreed to in June 1919, most govern-
ment agencies had stopped wartime procurement practices under Lever Act 
authority. The act remained in force, however, because the United States never 
ratified the treaty; technically, America was still at war. This allowed Daniels 
to persist in coercing procurements from oil firms. Something had changed, 
however—one firm fought back in court. Within a day of the conclusion of the 
Versailles agreement, Atlantic Refining sued the Navy for $2.2 million (over $30 
million in 2020 dollars) in compensation for fuel oil taken to date.56 
NAVY-INDUSTRY CONFLICT IN CALIFORNIA
The likelihood of a Navy-industry confrontation was mounting at a moment that 
otherwise was auspicious for American naval power. The end of the war meant 
that some oil-powered dreadnoughts could be reassigned from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific. This radically altered the Pacific balance of power in America’s favor. 
To understand how great a change this was, consider that back in 1897 Assis-
tant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt had asked then-Captain French 
E. Chadwick what it would take to “smash the Japanese Navy” if it attacked 
Hawaii, not yet a U.S. territory. The limited range of coal-powered warships 
made Roosevelt’s question almost unanswerable. Coal-powered warships from 
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West Coast home ports barely could reach Hawaii before having to turn around 
to refuel.57 There simply was no way to stand and fight a “battle of Hawaii.” All 
this changed on 26 July 1919, when five oil-powered superdreadnoughts of the 
newly constituted Pacific Fleet completed their first transit of the Panama Canal, 
making the United States a Pacific superpower.58 The fleet’s progress northward 
was celebrated in California with patriotic headlines such as “Giant Guns Thun-
der Salute to Navy Chief; San Diego Wild with Enthusiasm as Imposing Armada 
Steams before Daniels.”59 
It seems safe to infer that before the Pacific Fleet’s arrival in San Diego the 
Navy’s fuel-oil requirements on the West Coast were modest. Anticipating that 
requirements would rise, Daniels announced that the Navy would “commandeer 
fuel oil and gasoline required for the Pacific fleet because of unsatisfactory bids.” 
The so-called necessity to commandeer arose, as it had during the war, because 
Daniels was unwilling to pay market price. The Navy had a stark choice, Daniels 
maintained: either it could seize the oil it needed, as it had during the war, or it 
could abandon plans for a Pacific Fleet.60 With this false dichotomy as apparent 
justification, Daniels announced a plan to procure fuel oil in California that was 
very like the plan established in 1917 for the Atlantic, under Lever Act authority. 
“Under the navy orders placed today the west coast concerns will be required to 
supply the navy’s demands and to accept a price to be fixed later after the navy 
department has carefully investigated the cost of production and delivery at Pa-
cific coast points.”61 
By 16 August 1919, it became clear that Daniels meant for the FTC to conduct 
an investigation to determine West Coast production costs. From this, Daniels 
ostensibly could determine what fuel-oil price would be “fair.” California oil 
marketers resisted loudly and in public. As the Oil & Gas Journal reported, citing 
an undated issue of the Petroleum Reporter, “the producers see in the proposed 
investigation an attempt on the part of Secretary Daniels to whitewash his action 
in forcing the companies to sell to the navy at 86 cents a barrel here, although 
[the companies themselves] pay $1.53 at tidewater for the same product.” One 
producer averred that it was unfair that the Navy could force a 67-cent loss on 
the marketers on every barrel sold and threaten that “if they refuse they risk 
government seizure.”62 
The Navy soon escalated, threatening large firms with seizure of their 
refineries. This attracted national attention, albeit from a quarter friendly to the 
industry. The Wall Street Journal reprinted a protest by Standard Oil of California 
(Socal) against the seizures:
The oil companies have refused to execute the requisition agreements [from the 
Navy]. The necessities of the war are over and they decline voluntarily to submit to 
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the further taking of their property without just compensation. The marketing com-
panies have expressed their readiness and desire to supply the Navy’s requirements 
under ordinary commercial conditions, but they have declined to make deliveries 
upon the Navy’s confiscatory terms except under duress and compulsion of force 
used by the Navy. . . . Refusal to deliver the product commandeered has been met 
with the formal threat of an immediate seizure not only of the products in question 
but also of the plants at which they are produced.
In the meantime, the indebtedness of the Navy to the oil companies piles up. . . . Its 
bills are being paid to unwilling sellers by promises of adjustment now more than two 
years old. . . . It is a serious matter when a great agency of the government embarks 
on a policy of confiscation without hindrance by Congress or the Chief Executive.63 
Public awareness was no barrier to Daniels’s aggression; he continued to prey 
on the companies, apparently confident that he still could seize oil if he could 
not buy it at the price he wanted. Beginning in January 1920, however, Daniels 
acquired a vocal and influential adversary in Admiral Sims, whose critique of the 
secretary’s war management caused an immediate sensation. Sims accused the 
secretary of having been laggard in adopting modern naval-warfare tactics and 
of several other managerial failures. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs be-
gan hearings on Daniels’s management that would last until the end of May. The 
committee recorded over 3,500 pages of testimony, much of it in vehement op-
position to Daniels. By the time 1920 ended Lieutenant Kittredge had completed 
his 450-page book excoriating Daniels, basing his analysis on the Naval Affairs 
Committee testimony.64 
However, as those hearings began in March, Daniels—perhaps to demonstrate 
his resolve—threatened to commandeer still more fuel oil if the companies re-
fused to offer contracts at “reasonable prices.” As they had done in 1919, the com-
panies tried to evade supplying the Navy by bidding on only a tiny fraction of the 
volume sought.65 In April 1920, Daniels’s management was implicitly condemned 
in recommendations by the Naval Affairs Committee for a complete reorganiza-
tion of the Navy. Defiant, Daniels advertised that he would step up seizures in 
anticipation of repeal of the Lever Act, whose authority he continued to invoke 
even in the second year of peace.66 
In late June, the General Petroleum Company began what would become the 
most forceful resistance yet to Navy commandeering. Up to that moment, only 
the Atlantic Refining Company had resisted by taking the United States to court 
over Navy confiscations.67 After General Petroleum won a temporary federal 
restraining order protecting the firm from seizures, a rumor circulated that 
“unless the company agreed to sell oil to the navy at the navy department’s price” 
Marines would be landed to seize fuel oil physically from General’s refinery in 
Los Angeles Harbor.68 
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The rumor was “nonsense,” according to Admiral Hugh Rodman, commander 
of the Pacific Fleet, who pushed responsibility for any commandeering of oil up 
the chain of command. This took little time, as Secretary Daniels was aboard 
Rodman’s flagship New Mexico in Los Angeles Harbor. The pride of the fleet, the 
two-year-old, oil-powered dreadnought had returned only recently from ferrying 
President Wilson to sign the Versailles Treaty (which the Senate declined to 
ratify). Now Rodman and his boss were about to take New Mexico on a jaunt to 
San Francisco to attend the Democratic Party national convention.69 
General Petroleum’s suit singled out Daniels; Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan, 
the Navy’s paymaster general; and a few other officers. It argued that the oil they 
sought at $1.11 would cost $1.42 to replace, and that the firm had contracts 
with buyers for the same oil at $1.85. The Navy, in short, was seeking a price 
per barrel 22 percent below wholesale. The U.S. attorney defended the Navy, 
calling these “quibbling reasons,” and asserted that the Navy “had merely set a 
figure as a temporary price for an advance payment.” On Lever Act grounds, 
Rodman challenged the company’s right to sue, because without ratification of a 
peace treaty the United States was still “technically at war.” The Navy also noted 
that the Pacific Fleet faced a fuel-oil shortage, which moved a supply officer 
“to declare that the oil would be commandeered, by force if necessary, and that 
marines might be landed to seize the oil.”70 Rumors of the use of force, it seemed, 
might come true. Daniels thus was sticking with the tactic he had used with such 
success ever since Lever’s enactment; that is, the Navy would pay nothing or a 
price well under market, evade the price adjudication that Lever mandated, and 
then attempt to use FTC estimates to justify a lowball price. What was new was 
the threat to use the Marines to enforce the scheme.
General Petroleum’s bid for a permanent injunction against seizures ultimately 
was dismissed, on the reasonable grounds that naval readiness could be at risk. 
Yet the presiding judge, Benjamin Franklin Bledsoe, evaded the core price adju-
dication problem, calling instead for just compensation “according to the usual 
rules and principles that obtain in courts of law.”71 The problem was that there 
never had been anything “usual” in the Navy’s seizures, nor any provision for how 
the price disputes that led to them were to be settled.
Judge Bledsoe also ruled that force could be used to compel the company to 
deliver oil at $1.11 per barrel, even though the Navy already had contracted for 
a small quantity (two thousand barrels) at the much higher per-barrel price of 
$2.85 then prevailing. The judge, however, insisted that only a jury could decide 
what the price for new procurements should be, and further muddied the issue 
of price adjudication by referring, vaguely, to a “judicial tribunal” that should 
determine the price.72 Since the Lever Act was silent on precisely how prices 
should be adjudicated, this left Daniels with the upper hand.
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The companies’ economic fight with the Navy continued around San Francisco 
Bay a few days later. On 7 July, the Union Oil Company refused to deliver a tiny 
quantity of oil at $1.60 per barrel to the Mare Island Naval Station in Vallejo. A 
Union official declared that “it was unjust for the Navy to attempt the use of a war 
time measure to extract a more favorable price than other customers were pay-
ing, the market figure being $2.60.” The official also hinted at a passive-aggressive 
tactic that evidence suggests large California oil firms may have employed widely 
in the second half of 1920. “The navy may take oil from us and fix its price, but it 
cannot compel us to continue to refine oil at navy prices or sell at navy figures.”73 
What this meant was that Union was minimizing fuel-oil production to avoid loss-
making seizures; other firms probably were too. Perhaps for that reason, on 17 July 
Mare Island Station sent a demand for more fuel oil to four of the five California 
firms from whom the Navy had been seizing oil since 1917, offering $1.72 per bar-
rel; the fifth firm, General Petroleum, already had been subdued in Los Angeles. 
Although the Navy’s $1.72 was slightly higher than its offer from two weeks before, 
a reporter noted that market price was “steadily rising above that figure.”74 
The California supply never had been tighter than in the summer of 1920, 
and meanwhile nationwide consumption was growing at 25 percent a year. 
Rapidly growing legions of California automobile owners pushed gasoline 
demand ahead of refinery capacity, while fine weather extended the driving 
season. To contend with the demand surge, the oil industry in California, 
Oregon, and Washington adopted a remarkable and comprehensive suite of 
demand-suppression measures. These included demand prioritization, tiered 
pricing, rationing, forced substitution to lower grades of fuel, and proselytizing 
for conservation. The companies also held down price and, as we will see, 
sold some grades at a loss. In a study of this unusual market, economists Alan 
Olmstead and Paul Rhode hypothesize “that the oil companies held prices down 
because they were afraid of hostile government actions.”75 The Navy’s fuel-oil 
seizures, as revealed in the present article, strongly appear to be the “hostile 
government actions” that Olmstead and Rhode inferred had intimidated the 
oil companies into forgoing price increases.
The convergence of rapid demand growth, regional scarcity, and Daniels’s 
anticorporate aggression created a strong incentive for California oil companies 
to do two things: (1) maximize gasoline production, which happened to require 
minimizing the refining of fuel oil, and (2) avoid supplying fuel oil to the Navy 
at a loss. For example, Union Oil’s tactic of declining to refine fuel oil, which 
the other large California firms appear to have followed, seems to have been a 
response to both the general scarcity of gasoline and the desire to avoid supplying 
the Navy. Navy behavior also explains oil-industry reluctance to advance West 
Coast gasoline prices in line with national upward trends. The firms seem to have 
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feared that raising prices would harden public opinion further against them, thus 
allowing the Navy’s economic aggression to intensify.
Meanwhile, the combination of crude shortages and company efforts to avoid 
further seizures was affecting Navy readiness in the Pacific. By late July, fuel oil 
was so scarce that the Navy began burning coal in three oil-powered dreadnoughts 
based in California home ports. Then the unthinkable happened: on or shortly be-
fore 24 July 1920, one of six destroyers en route from San Diego to San Francisco 
ran out of fuel oil at sea and had to be rescued by a coal-burning tugboat.76 
This moved the Navy to act even more aggressively against the companies. 
The Department of Justice was consulted, after which AG A. Mitchell Palmer 
instructed the U.S. district attorney to assist the Navy if necessary. Then a 
“high officer” of the Twelfth Naval District, headquartered at Mare Island, 
threatened that the companies’ refusal to sell would result in either cancelation 
of a reservists’ training cruise in the six destroyers or the seizure of 150,000 
gallons of fuel oil so the cruise could proceed.77 The companies would not sell 
at $1.72 per barrel; hence seizures by armed force began on 26 July 1920 against 
northern California oil companies. Once the six destroyers from San Diego 
reached San Francisco Bay, they carried out a “threat to seize fuel oil from four 
companies [Socal, Union, Associated, and Shell] which had refused to sell at 
the price of $1.72 a barrel.”
Associated was targeted first. Ignoring the firm’s protest, Navy vessels snatched 
not 150,000 gallons, as threatened, but five hundred thousand gallons (about 
twelve thousand barrels); “[t]he Navy virtually seized the fuel,” Associated’s plant 
manager declared, “because it has the men to make good its threat to take this 
oil.” He complained that the cost of crude oil at the wellhead, two hundred miles 
away, was $1.60 per barrel, so the notion that it could be transported from there 
to San Francisco, then refined, stored, and sold for $1.72 was “ridiculous.” The 
Navy’s long habit of such behavior was why Associated earlier had declined to 
bid on new tenders. As the manager put it, “[W]e could not meet the price the 
Navy demanded without losing money.”78 Naval officers admonished the firm “to 
resort to court action” if it wanted a higher price for the confiscated oil.79 
With AG Palmer on his side, the following day Daniels took even-more-
aggressive steps. At Naval Coaling Station La Playa in San Diego, a four-million-
barrel storage facility was nearly empty, apparently because firms were unwilling 
to bid at a price the Navy would accept. So more than twenty warships from La 
Playa raided Union and Socal refinery wharves, paying $1.72 per barrel.80 Two 
days later, a subdued Socal agreed to a three-month contract for three hundred 
thousand barrels at $2.00.81 Apparently Socal, to avoid future confrontations, was 
willing to accept payment that was well below market price. The price of fuel oil 
increased steadily for the remainder of the summer of 1920, which made Socal’s 
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price concession ever more painful to sustain. However, although no one knew it 
at the time, the oil price bubble soon would burst; the thirty-year price maximum 
was just a few months in the future.
Shell was the last firm willing to risk physical resistance to the Navy. Daniels 
may have regarded the Anglo-Dutch giant as the least pliable of the five big West 
Coast firms, and saved his assault on it for last. Oil prices had continued to rise 
all summer, but in response to Shell’s asking price of $2.35 in early September the 
Mare Island commandant led a party of Marines into the Shell refinery at Marti-
nez. On 11 September, they smashed heavy locks on outlet valves, apparently set 
in anticipation of the Navy’s arrival. After a formal request to purchase at $2.00 
per barrel, the raiding party drew off two thousand barrels.82 
After that, Shell seems to have ceased refining, in an effort to avoid further 
losses. When the Navy tanker Chenwa arrived in Martinez on 20 September to 
procure a large order of fuel oil, Shell employees offered no resistance—nor any 
assistance. Soon after Chenwa’s pumps began to work, however, the sailors rec-
ognized to their horror that the oil they were drawing was “unfit of use owing to 
insufficient refining.”83 Shell apparently had left unrefined heavy crude in the stor-
age tank it expected the Navy to raid. The Navy understood Shell’s action as the re-
taliation it was, and Daniels’s campaign of economic intervention via armed force 
escalated in response. As of 24 September, “[a]rmed marines are today standing 
guard over the plant of the Shell Oil Co. at Martinez. Following the failure of the 
navy to procure the oil through forcible seizure because the company is said to 
have diverted its oil, Rear Admiral [Joseph L.] Jayne, commandant of the Twelfth 
naval district, detailed an armed guard to watch the oil plant. The guard has been 
instructed to prevent all shipment of oil by the company until the navy obtains 
its supply.”84 Since Shell refused to deliver as expected, the Navy explained, these 
measures were necessary to ensure that the company supplied “its pro rata share 
and as an act of justice to other companies and their customers.” Shell, for its part, 
insisted it had no agreement with the Navy.85 
Thus, company resistance to the Navy was long in coming, beginning only late 
in 1919, by Atlantic Refining, and intensifying in California during 1920—more 
than three years after nonpayments and underpayments began. As the California 
companies began to resist, they were engaged simultaneously in a costly program 
of retail price restraint and rationing to suppress gasoline demand growth. The 
California firms understood that, politically, they could not raise the price of 
gasoline while the Navy was confiscating their products and berating them for 
profiteering, regardless of the economic reality that they lost money on every 
barrel seized.
Armed seizures from domestic businesses during peacetime by a U.S. military 
force were something new in American history—akin to internal piracy. Seizures 
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without force began before the Lever Act gave the Navy any sliver of legality and 
continued after fuel administrator Requa’s failed effort to establish a fair price. At 
Daniels’s direction, things escalated from there.
PEAK OIL AND THE COURSE THAT WAS FOLLOWED
Republican Warren G. Harding’s landslide victory in the November 1920 
presidential election dashed any hope Daniels had of remaining in government 
via the good offices of his former assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who was the losing Democratic Party candidate for vice president. Daniels’s 
most ruthless ally, AG Palmer, also was a lame duck. Faced with impending 
replacement by a Republican appointee and with his public humiliation in the 
Senate hearings a recent memory, Daniels may have been moved by the prospect 
of further accountability to a change of political style. After eight years of either 
lambasting his critics or ignoring them, Daniels suddenly began trying to explain 
himself. In so doing he revealed the remarkable plan he had followed for eight 
years, in anticipation of the peak-oil crisis that Interior had predicted.
The secretary’s revelation came in response to a pointed critique from 
Thomas A. O’Donnell, president of the newly constituted American Petroleum 
Institute (API). The Los Angeles oilman had worked closely with Requa on the 
PWSC, but ultimately resigned in exasperation at obstacles the government had 
thrown in the path of wartime production. In a long and combative speech to 
the API, O’Donnell rejected Interior’s peak-oil theory and blamed the Navy 
and the FTC for the dire supply problems on the West Coast. A trade-journal 
reporter summarized O’Donnell’s message as follows: “The only danger to the 
maintenance of an adequate supply that he sees is in continuation of agitation 
fomented by foolish politicians and pseudo-scientists against the industry, re-
strictions placed on the oil man by the government, and barring the American 
oil man from development of foreign fields [as Britain, the Netherlands, and 
some oil-producer states were doing].”86 
O’Donnell also attacked Interior’s assertion that present shortages constituted 
evidence of peak oil. While acknowledging that there was “a serious world-wide 
shortage of petroleum” at that moment, he delivered the following explanation: 
Important discoveries are continuing to occur in this country and, I believe, 
additional discoveries will be made long after the time limit set for exhaustion by 
some of our experts. . . . The present shortage has not been caused by any serious 
exhaustion of the petroleum deposits, but has been caused by extraordinary increased 
consumption. In the United States the production of petroleum has increased about 
25 per cent in a little over a year. . . . Agitation by government officials, statesmen, 
or politicians is just as dangerous as governmental regulation and interference. It 
destroys stability, credit, and confidence.87 
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O’Donnell was rightly confident that recent price increases would call 
forth more than enough new production, and he was particularly critical of 
Navy land withdrawals to create the Naval Oil Reserve. The land withdrawals 
negated millions of dollars invested there and discouraged further investment. 
As O’Donnell put it, “[T]he attitude of the navy department toward Pacific 
coast producers, coupled with agitation for governmental investigation of the 
industry, nearly always by men not familiar with the subject and frequently with 
preconceived prejudice, has had a destructive influence on the development of 
petroleum resources on the Pacific coast.” Alluding to the oil seizures of the past 
summer and fall, O’Donnell complained, “While an armistice has been signed 
with the Germans, no armistice has been offered to the oil producers by the Navy 
Department.”88 
Daniels responded to O’Donnell vigorously, revealing much about the central-
ity of the theory of peak oil to Wilsonian oil policy. Daniels maintained that he 
had had no choice but to act as he did. Referring to his consultation with Secre-
tary Lane in 1915, Daniels wrote to O’Donnell, reminding him that “[b]efore we 
adopted the policy of burning oil, the question of the adequate supply for future 
use was thoroughly investigated and assurances received . . . from the Interior De-
partment that such a supply would be available.” As Daniels saw it, there was no 
alternative to his policy of oil seizures and mineral-patent repatriation. As he told 
the oilman, “I cannot see how any other course could have been followed when 
the unprecedented conditions following the war resulted in a world shortage of 
oil. It would have been suicidal to have opened up our reserves set aside for the 
future to meet a temporary situation in the present.”89 
With respect to peak oil, Daniels’s declaration was elliptical in comparison 
with his bold assertion of 1915 that the entire world would run out of oil at the 
same time, leaving the Naval Oil Reserve as the last oil on earth. Yet peak oil was 
still on the secretary’s mind. The reserves, he told O’Donnell, were “set aside for 
the future,” and not even the present severe shortage—in which a Navy warship 
had run out of oil at sea—was critical enough to open them. Implicit but clear was 
that the future for which the Naval Oil Reserve was being saved was one in which 
American oil production was exhausted.90 Thus, what O’Donnell protested as 
Navy lawlessness was, to Daniels, an inevitable necessity if the Naval Oil Reserve 
was to be protected until peak oil arrived.
It was ironic that oil price was the issue that led to so many seizures. 
Progressives’ ire against the oil companies over high prices rang hollow even 
at the time; prices of everything had increased greatly between 1916 and 1920, 
as economist Alvin H. Hansen explained in a 1920 article.91 The prices of 
naval stores (a category including pitch, paint, resin, tar, turpentine, and pine 
oil), as but one example, rose 300 percent in 1918 alone.92 In 1919 prices rose 
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still higher. In both years, industry observers compared the naval stores price 
increases to “the phenomenal prices of the Civil War period, when the supplies 
of turpentine and rosin were cut off by the armies of the South.”93 Why oil prices 
should be considered too high for the Navy when the entire economy was racked 
by rampant postwar inflation was something Daniels never tried to explain. 
Interior’s peak-oil activism, meanwhile, was becoming more fevered. “[N]othing 
is more certain,” declared USGS chief geologist David White, than that U.S. 
production would begin its terminal decline within two to three years.94 The price 
of oil, therefore, should rise. To an ultra-Progressive such as Daniels, however, 
an oil-price increase could have but one explanation: profiteering, which must 
be opposed as a matter of patriotism. Daniels thus maintained to O’Donnell that 
he had had no alternative but to act as he did: lowballing California producers, 
withholding their compensation, and ultimately seizing their oil by force. Daniels 
also claimed that the Navy had tried to obtain “so far as possible, oils from other 
than American fields.” This claim may be true, but research for this article found 
no records or discussion of procurements or seizures from the most conspicuous 
importer in California, Doheny’s Mexican Petroleum Company.
Lastly, Daniels reminded O’Donnell that California firms had been paid a 
“tentative price . . . until such time as just compensation could be determined.” 
This was not false, but it hid more than it revealed. First, only Socal had been 
offered “just compensation”; second, no method of adjudication had been es-
tablished; and third, Daniels long since had rejected Sanderson & Porter’s meth-
odology for fair price estimates. So firms had to consider the possibility that the 
“tentative price” might be the last one the Navy ever would offer. In any case, 
Daniels concluded to O’Donnell, his hands were tied; “I don’t see how we could 
have done anything else in this matter.”95
Two extreme ideologies found expression in Josephus Daniels’s management 
of the naval oil supply. The first was Progressivism, which to Secretary Daniels 
meant an assumption that in any relation between a large, private business 
and the Navy the business had an unfair advantage that he was duty bound to 
overcome. The second was oil-scarcity ideology—that is, the peak-oil theory 
that Daniels absorbed from scientists of the Department of the Interior, and 
the inference drawn from peak oil that an aggressive policy was needed to avert 
terminal scarcity.96 
Following the ostensible imperatives of these ideologies, Daniels fashioned 
an unusual, confrontational, and almost delusional oil policy. To compensate 
for what he thought was the impending exhaustion of American oil production, 
Daniels created and defended the Naval Oil Reserve, which had to be kept un-
touched until the day when all the world’s oil fields ran dry simultaneously. Yet 
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Daniels never defined how the Navy would know that peak oil was near or what 
the criteria were for opening the Naval Oil Reserve. Having an oil reserve was, of 
course, not a bad thing, but Daniels had no policy other than to protect it against 
the presumptive day when exhaustion was near.
To preserve the reserve, Daniels determined to take oil at the price he 
considered fair—always below market price—or withhold payment from the 
oil companies altogether. This policy began even before the 1917 passage of the 
Lever Act allowed the government to seize fuel if a price could not be agreed on. 
Daniels’s campaign of oil seizure continued throughout America’s participation 
in World War I and right up until Daniels’s last months in office. Some firms 
went unpaid or underpaid for three and a half years, from spring 1917 to late 
fall 1920.
Daniels’s transfer of oil-powered warships to West Coast home ports was 
strongly positive for the growth of American naval power in the Pacific Ocean, 
but their arrival in California during a severe gasoline shortage provoked the sec-
retary to harsher measures to secure oil. After the Navy began using force to enter 
the refineries of firms unwilling to sell at a price Daniels would pay, companies ap-
pear to have responded by minimizing their production of fuel oil. One firm even 
tricked the Navy, placing crude oil the Navy could not use in the tank it expected 
the Navy to raid. This defiance moved Daniels to surround the offending refinery 
with armed Marines so that, if the Navy could not get oil by seizure, no one else 
could get any by purchase. Daniels’s most extreme acts took place in the summer 
and fall of 1920, during the run-up to the presidential election in November—
which Republican candidate Warren G. Harding won. Daniels may have called 
an end to seizures once he knew Harding would take office; there is no direct 
evidence of this, but a California newspaper database that returned much useful 
information about seizures between 1917 and October 1920 returned nothing for 
the short portion of Daniels’s tenure that came after the election.
While Daniels’s oil-seizure campaign was an aberration in Navy history, it was 
not so unusual in the context of Wilsonian interventionism. Wilson normalized 
lawlessness against those whom Progressives considered unpatriotic or alien. 
However, that lawlessness mainly was directed downward, against the weak 
(e.g., labor unionists, blacks, and immigrants); Daniels, by contrast, used the 
imaginary peak-oil crisis to direct the power of the state upward, against large oil 
corporations. This use of peak oil as the rationale to do something aggressive is 
the essence of “oil-scarcity ideology,” a thought system that has had a profound 
impact on American foreign policy.97 
The 1914 U.S. invasion of Veracruz, Mexico, was typical of aggressive policies 
rationalized by oil-scarcity ideology. These were foreign policies adopted to secure 
a supply for the United States and to preempt other countries from doing so for 
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themselves to the detriment of the United States. Daniels’s use of scarcity ideology 
was unusual in that his aggression was directed inward, against corporations of his 
own country; it was more typical for such force to be exerted outward.
The most significant later policy rationalized by scarcity ideology was the 
Carter Doctrine of 1980. It asserted that the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf 
constituted an American national interest, and that flow was to be defended by 
force, if necessary. The policy was based on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
peak-oil theory. By the mid-1980s, the agency claimed, the United States would 
be out of oil, along with many other countries; only the Middle East would have 
any oil left. This argument was put to President Carter in the days before he 
proclaimed the doctrine that now bears his name.98 But the CIA was wrong, and 
for the same reasons that Britain’s eighteenth- and nineteenth-century peak-
coal forecasts were wrong, which were the same reasons that Interior’s peak-oil 
forecasts of 1908–20 were wrong: their models assumed that there would be no 
technological progress, and that rising prices would not stimulate investors to 
look harder for oil than they had when prices were low.99 The CIA also concluded 
that an oil-starved Soviet Union would invade Iran to replace its own failing sup-
ply; however, it was fairly obvious from Western energy journals that the USSR 
faced no oil crisis.100 Nonetheless, to deter the anticipated Soviet attack on Iran 
that peak oil supposedly would provoke, a large USN force was sent to the Persian 
Gulf in 1980, where it remains to this day.101 
Josephus Daniels hardly was alone in falling under the influence of a destruc-
tive and persuasive strain of bad science—perhaps the worst ever practiced. In a 
sense, he was a victim of the scientists who concocted an analysis that asserted 
that the United States would run out of oil by the 1930s. One might fault Daniels 
for ignoring the oil industry’s consistent rejection of the peak-oil theory, but no 
other federal official questioned peak oil either, save for the four geologists who 
in 1908 challenged the plausibility of mineral-exhaustion forecasts but were ig-
nored. One lesson of this affair is that American political leaders are vulnerable to 
persuasion that oil is running out and are willing to take extreme action, includ-
ing attacks on their own nation’s oil industry, to avert even imaginary oil crises. 
The other is that scientists are as willing as anyone else to invoke the specter of 
implausible catastrophe to enhance their personal or bureaucratic authority.
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